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Discussion of ‘Disclosure and the cost of 
capital: what do we know?’ 
Stephen Cooper* 
This paper is a valuable summary of the work that 
has been produced on how accounting, and partic- 
ularly the disclosures in financial statements, af- 
fects cost of capital. Much of this research has 
been produced by Professor Botosan herself and I 
congratulate her on this paper and her past re- 
search. I support her conclusions that improved 
disclosure reduces cost of capital, partly because I 
believe that the research is compelling, but also 
because of my own observations about how the 
lack of transparency in accounting influences in- 
vestment recommendations of UBS analysts and 
investment decisions of portfolio managers. 
Although cost of capital is clearly a key driver of 
equity values, it is one of the most difficult com- 
ponents to measure. Professor Botosan rightly 
points out the limitations of a CAPM approach to 
determining cost of capital, particularly that beta 
may not capture all of the risk factors priced by the 
market. CAPM can be extended to multifactor 
models, which conceivably could include account- 
ing disclosure related variables; but there is no the- 
oretical basis for determining what the factors 
should be or how they should to be priced. The 
UBS approach to cost of capital, like most applied 
in practice, is based upon CAPM. However, we do 
not apply this in a rigid manner and believe that 
analyst judgment is important in determining a dis- 
count rate, just as it is in estimating future cash 
flows. While beta may be a key factor in calculat- 
ing cost of capital, analysts are free to adjust the 
beta to a value that they consider better reflects the 
level of risk actually priced by market participants 
and also to adjust the resulting cost of capital (or 
valuation) for further factors that are considered 
relevant. Such adjustments could and often do take 
account of the quality of disclosure and accounting 
transparency. 
The focus of research on the impact of disclo- 
sure on cost of capital is one of relative differences 
in the cost of capital of companies. Therefore it is 
not so important that accurate absolute measures 
of cost of capital are obtained. For this reason the 
*The author is managing director, UBS. E-mail: 
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inherent difficulty of using a traditional dividend 
discount model approach (or variations thereon) 
would not seem to impact the research as much as 
one might have expected. As long as the models 
can successfully differentiate relative differences 
in discount rate then successful investigation of the 
impact of disclosure should be possible. However, 
one must caution against taking even these cost of 
capital measures without question. Consensus an- 
alyst forecasts are generally assumed to be opti- 
mistic and long-term growth rates given by 
analysts are, I believe, often unreliable. Also, there 
is no standard definition of pro forma or adjusted 
earnings that forms the basis for consensus fore- 
casts. We know that different brokers and indeed 
different analysts supply data prepared on a differ- 
ent basis. This is evident if one examines the de- 
tailed historical data provided by individual 
analysts, where differences can be significant. 
Professor Botosan points out the possibility of 
measurement error if the market and analysts hold 
different beliefs, but emphasises that this is only a 
problem if the error is systematically related to the 
variables of interest. One cannot be sure whether 
this is the case or not, however, in my experience 
because model errors can be sector related and be- 
cause disclosure could be sector related as well; 
this is an area that deserves further investigation. 
Analysts are frequently critical of the lack of dis- 
closures in financial statements. Too often compa- 
nies provide the bare minimum disclosure that is 
required by accounting standards without consid- 
ering what disclosures are actually necessary to 
fully understand their results and financial posi- 
tion. Presumably this is a trade-off between the 
perceived disadvantages of disclosure, including 
the communication of information that might be 
useful to competitors and the flexibility non-dis- 
closure gives in terms of managing the information 
flow and consequently managing investor percep- 
tions and the advantage of a lower cost of capital. 
A search in the UBS database of over 300,000 
analyst reports reveals many cases where account- 
ing disclosure had an impact on investment rec- 
ommendations and valuations. The following is a 
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presented by the company’s low accounting trans- 
parency and lack of detailed disclosures on opera- 
tional details’. In this case the impact on valuation 
was unspecified but in some cases analysts are 
more specific. For example, ‘ . . .our €6 I price tar- 
get is after applying a 5% discount to reflect con- 
cerns on accounting transparency’. Although in 
this case the adjustment is to the valuation direct- 
ly, in effect the analyst is raising the discount rate. 
Allowing for typical equity duration, the cost of 
capital effect being priced is perhaps 20bp to 30bp. 
There are also many incidents that I have en- 
countered where analysts and investors are clearly 
influenced by lack of accounting transparency. In 
a recent case an investor refused to invest in a 
company due to uncertainty over the assumptions 
used to measure the pension liability. This liability 
was highly material, but there was no disclosure of 
the longevity assumption underpinning the calcu- 
lation. Given the known variations in longevity as- 
sumptions applied in practice, and the material 
impact this can have on the liability, the investor 
was reluctant to commit funds without such dis- 
closure. In a separate example, an analyst was 
struggling to reconcile amounts in the financial 
statements in relation to deferred taxation. The 
amounts disclosed were not analysed sufficiently 
to identify what impact the deferred tax accounting 
was having on performance metrics. This not only 
led to a lack of confidence that reported earnings 
represented the true profitability of the business, 
but also led to suspicion on the part of the analyst 
that this could indicate that perhaps other aspects 
of the financial statements were not as they 
seemed. Not surprisingly, this lack of accounting 
transparency influenced the analyst’s view of the 
investment. Consequently, a lower valuation mul- 
tiple was applied than perhaps otherwise would 
have been attributed to the company. Although in 
this case the analyst’s caution was not explicitly 
reflected in a higher discount rate, the impact on 
value was the same. 
Considering the attitude of UBS analysts to 
companies that have poor disclosure, and in view 
of the evidence from the research highlighted in 
this paper, I have no doubt that improved disclo- 
sure and better transparency in accounting does 
serve to increase market prices. What I am not sure 
about is the mechanism with which this actually 
occurs. For example, it may be that rather than dis- 
closure influencing the cost of capital, perhaps it 
influences perception of future cash flows, or at 
least the distribution of future cash flows. Analyst 
earnings forecasts are not necessarily true proba- 
bility weighted average expected values. I believe 
there is a tendency for analysts to forecast the ‘suc- 
cess scenario’ and particularly to disregard low 
probability severely adverse outcomes. Although 
analyst forecasts may be their best estimate of the 
‘most likely’ outcome because the distribution of 
possible outcomes may not always be symmetri- 
cal, then this may not be a true expected value. If 
the distribution is skewed to the downside then an- 
alyst forecasts are biased upwards. However, this 
bias may not true of the market as a whole, where 
low probability adverse outcomes are perhaps 
more efficiently priced. This may explain why div- 
idend discount models often tend to produce high 
cost of capital estimates. Could it be that better 
disclosure gives the market greater confidence that 
a very unfavourable outcome (perhaps due to 
fraud) is less likely? After all, where disclosure is 
poor the question is always what negative infor- 
mation is being hidden rather than the opposite. If 
this is the case, then value may rise as disclosure 
increases because investors are modifying their as- 
sumptions about the probabilities of different pay- 
offs, rather than discounting cash flows at a 
different rate. Of course the net result is the same; 
better disclosure equals higher value. 
I would greatly appreciate further research on 
the link between disclosure and cost of capital. It 
would be interesting to see what types of disclo- 
sure have greatest impact. For example, how does 
information disclosed about risks, the level of de- 
tail provided in segmental analysis or the quality 
of accounting policy disclosures impact the cost of 
capital? Also, there is the important question of 
how measurement as well as presentation impacts 
the view of investors. For example, does fair value 
measurement rather than a historical cost approach 
provide more relevant information to users and 
hence give greater confidence and reduce the cost 
of capital? Alternatively, does the greater volatili- 
ty in reported earnings that likely results for a fair 
value approach perhaps have the opposite effect 
and result in a higher cost of capital? 
Let us hope the transition to IFRS and the re- 
sulting change in both disclosure and measure- 
ment will provide researchers with a whole new 
dataset to use such that some of these question 
might be answered. 
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